Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Faculty Publications - School of Business

School of Business

1983

Promising Developments for Conceptualizing and
Modeling Institutional Change
Irma Adelman
Thomas F. Head
George Fox University, thead@georgefox.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfsb
Part of the Business Commons
Recommended Citation
Published in Working Paper no. 259, Gianni Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, reprinted in Institutions and Development
Strategies: The Selected Essays of Irma Adelman, Volume 1, pp. 64-82

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Business at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications - School of Business by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more
information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

[4]
PROMlSING DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONCEPTUALIZING AND
MODELING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Irma Adelman and Thomas F. Head

Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Kuznets (1966) states that economic growth is a combination of changes in patterns of
production and increases in per capita income and population and that the distinction
between this and economic development is that economic development is economic growth
combined with institutional change. Our profession has had difficulty giving proper weight
to this distinction. We have too readily painted institutions as exogenous or varying
parametrically and have thus avoided adequate consideration of the institutional aspects of
economic development. And so we are adding our voice to those who would urge us to come
to grips more seriously with this issue.
Institutional changes associated with development have too often been overlooked by
economists as important areas of research. Institutional change is mentioned frequently, but
it is seldom studied in the same rigorous manner that one examines other economic adjustments. Much of the writing in this area has not gone beyond the processes of formulating
taxonomies, identifying linkages, pinpointing institutional constraints, and brainstorming
about institutional innovations. This largely descriptive work has failed to stock the analytical
cupboard with the conceptual appratus needed for a disciplined study of institutions. Unease
with this condition has prompted a new wave of institutional research.
A necessary preliminary to institutional modeling is a definition of an "institution." Of
the many possible definitions, the one which appeals to us the most is that an institution is
a patterned form of interaction among human beings. This definition is very broad and
encompasses at least three levels of institutions. On the one level we find the cultural values
and modes that constitute the general framework within which the lower level institutions
operate. Another level is composed of the laws and regulations which specify what we might
call "the rules ofthe game." A third level is made up of the contractual arrangements which
are used to effect transactions. Much of the recent research on institutional questions within
development economics has focused on this last level.
Proceeding with this definition in mind, we will discuss three topics: first, we will
describe those aspects of institutions which must be considered when formulating a model;
second, we will present an overview of various conceptual approaches that have been adapted
to study institutions; and, finally, we shall discuss some potential techniques for modeling
institutions.
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I.

Goals and Structure

What must one be able to specify about an institution in order to adequately model it
and examine its behavior '! A few thoughts are offered here on what aspects of an institution
should be included in a description which is good for modeling how institutions emerge and
change.
First, one needs to describe the goals of an institution. Four categories of goals come to
mind. These are (1) growth; (2) insurance and safety; (3) transfer and distribution; and (4)
enforcement, control, and regulation. It is helpful to view the goals of all institutions as
mixtures of these four categories. A good example is the family. The family has some growth
goals as expressed in the coming of a new generation and the provision of an environment for
the rearing of that generation. It meets an insurance-safety goal by providing a stand by
capacity for coping with crises generated by any of its members. It is a transfer mechanism
and, in that function, redistributes income and wealth within and among generations. Children's
complaints serve as one obvious reminder of the family as an enforcement, control, and
regulatory mechanism.
Besides identifying goals, the other major aspect which needs specification is structure.
How is an institution put together, and how does it work? The various elements of
institutional structure can be characterized by specifying the principles governing four
structural aspects : (1) the division of labor, (2) the allocation of resources, (3) the
system of incentives, (4) the rules for entry and exit, and (5) the rules of interaction with
the rest of the economic and political system. We will discuss each of these in turn.
DIVISION OF LABOR
The pattern of division of labor deals with the assignment of tasks and responsibilities
within the institution. It may be rigid or fluid, formal or informal. Principles of assignment
are many. One common example discussed by economists is comparative advantage. Other
principles, perhaps better known to other social scientists, are habit (which, incidentally,
might lead to the development of comparative advantage); the voluntary acceptance of
perceived tasks; and ascriptive principles based on age, sex, caste, or role.
Furthermore, the pattern of division of labor may be static or dynamic in the sense
that there may or may not be mobility. For example, in certain tribal societies, the
principle of division of labor is ascriptive by stages in the life cycle; or the mobility may be
that of a meritocracy in which dynamic change in assignment of tasks is conditional upon
performance. It should be noted that the division of labor may vary with the sphere of
activity, with some core functions being characterized by rigidly specified rules of division
of labor while some peripheral functions are left fluid, or vice versa.
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
First, one must have a clear idea of the resources involved-labor, financial resources,
time information, and access-and than a sense of the rules governing the use of these
resources. We may have allocation by a principle of sharing, by need, by role, etc. Also,
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the resource constraints may be tight or loose as in budget or labor constraints.
corporations, for example, do not have very binding budget constraints, nor do many larg~
private enterprises. Large enterprises can go to the stock market and have access to
borrowing. By contrast, small businesses generally have fairly binding budget constraints·
and individuals often have very binding budget constraints. Examination ofthe laoo;
constraints shows a somewhat different pattern. In the case of public enterprises, we see
a reasonably binding labor constraint. Family enterprises, on the other hand, have rather
loose labor constraints especially in societies characterized by extended families.
SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES
The third class of structural aspects which one needs to describe is the system or
incentives. Kenneth Boulding {1981) distinguishes three such systems: threat, exchange,
and love. These three systems, respectively, picture an economic agent taking some action
in order to avoid some negative impact, in order to attain some positive reward, or as
a one-way transfer or grant which does not involve any apparent reward/penalty motivation.
The exercise of power takes place both through threat and through exchange. We speak
of a firm having market power when it can credibly threaten to implement strategies which
have the potential to harm competitors. Within organizations, we clearly see behavior
motivated by both mechanisms of reward and mechanisms of penalty. One obvious example
of the system of love is child rearing or the grants economy, but Boulding argues that we
have underemphasized this system in our study of economics and that one-way transfers are
a wide-spread phenomenon which deserves more careful scrutiny.
When we examine any particular institution or organization, we, of course, observe a
mixture of each of these systems of incentives. And each system will be consonant to
varying degrees with the ethos of the institution, its goals, and the larger society of which
it is a part. Furthermore, the design and implementation of incentive systems leads to
varying degrees of effectiveness. As an example, consider Lester Thurow's {1981) point that
the system of incentives for management performance-quarter-by-quarter profits-is very poorly
designed to serve the dynamic growth goals of a firm which may require investing now and
thus, lowering current profits in order to increase profits later. It is, however, quite
consistent with the general ethos of the society at large. Another illustration comes from
the Me Namara years at the World Bank where one observed a conflict between two Bank
objectives : disbursing funds as quickly as possible and designing programs which would
effectively meet the poverty alleviation goals that Me Namara emphasized. Such povertyalleviation programs often require a higher proportion of design and administration costs
than do public works programs. It was easier to disburse funds quickly by building
roads, ports, and dams; but these were not necessarily the most efficient means of achieving
poverty alleviation. So the two sytems of incentives were in conflict.
ENTRY, EXIT AND INTERACTION
Finally, one needs to specify those aspects of structure which have to do with entry,
exit, and interaction with the environment. Frequently, formation, dissolution and inter-
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action are regulated by law. For example, the rules for establishing and dissolving a
marriage are governed by law, whereas the rules of operation within the marriage are largely
left open to the explicit and implicit contractual negotiations of the partners. In the commercial arena, we are all familiar with the variety of regulatory activities which shape the rules of
entry, exit, and interaction.
Up to this point, we have mentioned four classes of goals and have discussed five aspects
of structure. This inventory has been far from exhaustive; but we hope that it, at least,
points to the important components of a static description of an institution. As we have
noted frequently along the way, every institution is a complex mixture of the characteristics
identified above. Thus, an institution might best be defined by the degree to which each description is valid in each realm.
Having formed some sense of the static view of an institution, we can now examine some
of the more important conceptual approaches to the study of the dynamics of institutional
change.
II. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE : CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES
We review here recent contributions to the economic theory of institutions. However,
before proceeding to contemporary works, at least brief acknowledgement must be given to
the major figures in the history of economic thought who have trod the ground of institutional
inquiry. Without any claim of comprehensiveness, we select for comment Karl Marx (1925)
John R. Commons (1934), Thorstein Veblen 0973), and Wesley C. Mitchell (1949).
Marx, in a category by himself as the founding and dominant figure of a major school of
economic and political thought, obviously concerned himself with the structure of society and
with the generation of a perspective that did not take institutions as exogenously given but, instead, attempted to explain class formation, the interaction of classes, and transformations from
one economic order to another. Of central concern in the Marxian theory of value and exploitation are the institutions of tabor exchange and the related pattern of ownership and control of
the means of production. The expropriation of surplus product under various institutions of
labor exchange and the mechanisms of transformation from feudalism to capitalism and subsequently to socialism represent essential lines of inquiry to the Marxist. Particular emphasis
in recent years has been placed on the theory of the state [de Janvry ( 1981, pp. 183-197),
Jessop (1977), and Holloway and Picciotto (1979)].
We should not proceed without acknowledgement of the group of American economists
known as the Institutionalists. The dominant personalities in this chapter in the history of
economic thought were Veblen (1973), Commons (1934), and Mitchell (1949). These writers
shared a preoccupation with institutional variables -Veblen emphasizing cultural patterns
and customs; Commons focusing on labor, industrial organization, and the legal foundations
of economic transactions; and Mitchell attempting to advance the understanding of economic
institutions through gathering voluminous statistical data about them. The Institutionalists
reacted to a perceived narrowness of both the content and the methodology of the orthodoxy
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of their day; however they failed to establish a lasting major alternative school of thought and
are remembered today largely as eccentrics rather than major figures in the development
economic theory.
While the very mention of the term institution brings to mind the former Institutionallistf·
it should be clear that most modern economists who focus upon institutions would not single
out the Institutionalists as intellectual ancestors of particular importance to their work
would these modern economists, in general, seek to separate themselves from the ma.m•:.r.., _
of economic thought. A typical disclaimer is that of James Roumasset (1978): "In explain·
ing the existence and evolution of institutions the new institutional economics uses coJ~V~!"''"'"
nal economic tools such as benefits, costs andequlibrium. In explaining resource allocation
and income distribution, the new approach uses institutions in conjunction with rather than
as an alternative to neoclassical theory" (pp 1 and 2). The modern investigators are, in
general, attempting to endogenize significant phenomena which hitherto have often been assu.
med as exogenously given; these researchers frequently modify and expand their theoretical.
and methodological "tool kits" but very rarely find themselves desiring to be set apart from
the main stream of economists, in some cases the treatment of institutions has involved a
new championing of neoclassical economics.
In reviewing the modern institutional economics, three general approaches will be discus.
sed : cost benefit, conflict crisis, and sociobiology. Each is associated with a different, but
sometimes overlapping, group of scholars and body of literature.
COST BENEFIT
This class of approaches to institutional change posits that, when the expected cost is
lower than the expected benefit, an institution will be formed and that this will be efficient
from the point of view of society at large. An important qualification to this argument is
that introduced by the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965); there may well be net benefit for
society as a whole, but to each agent the benefit is so small that it pays to wait for others
to take the lead in reorganizing institutions.
A variant of this approach is the rent-seeking school [Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati
(1980)] which says that various interest groups will lobby for institutional changes when
the costs to them of such changes are smaller then the benefits; this approach recognizes
explicitly that what is good for the rentseekers may or may not be good for society as a
whole. Indeed, it is likely not to be good for society as a whole; and it is likely to drive
society as a whole to second-best or third-best situations. A qualification to this approach
is offered by the "fallacy of composition," i.e., because the activities of different special
interest groups may tend to cancel one another, the sum of their effects may be less than the
effect of each individual part (Olson, 1982). Hence, the rent-seeking activities of individual
groups may come to naught.
The boldest exponent of the cost-benefit approach to the modeling of institutions is
Gary Becker in whose work a wide range of behavioral norms (Becker, 1974) from

go
tal

an
llli

pr
at

Si
in
dt
fa
in
h

Institutions and Development Strategies 69
24

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING LITERATURE

discrimination to marriage (Becker, 1973) and altruism (Becker, 1976) are analyzed as
market phenomena. Although Becker has come to symbolize an extreme example in this
regard, he is certainly not alone in his desire to understand social institutions from the
perspective of neoclassical economics. For example, major contributions focusing on
property rights and public choice have been made by Demsetz (1967, 1969) and Alchain
and Demsetz (1972) [see also Downs (1958) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962)). In a
similar vein, questions in the economic history of institutional change have been treated by
Douglas North and his collaborators [Davis and North (1970, 1971) and North and Thomas
(1970)]. Most recently, North (1981) has called attention to the costs of defining and
enforcing the contractual rules that underly institutions which he calls transactions costs.
Transactions costs increase with specialization and reduce the net benefits from exchange
and trade. They are also affected by ideology. Although each of these-investigators has
his own unique outlook and questions, they all proceed from the common point of departure
that neoclassical theory -a conceptual tool kit that has been very successful in explaining
market behavior-also has great usefulness in understanding non-market decision making.
A major disadvantage of the cost-benefit school is that it admits to only one class of
goals, namely, the utility-enhancing, growth-oriented, efficiency oriented goals. It does not
take into account insurance and safety goals and only poorly accommodates distributional
and regulatory goals. Also, this literature offers only two kinds of conflict-resolution
mechanisms-payoff or coercion and thus does not give appropriate attention to compromise-oriented mechanisms.
In the development literature neoclassical analysis of institutions has been applied to the
analysis of contractual arrangements in sharecropping [Cheung (1969)] and Bardhan and
Singh (forthcoming)]; the choice of tenancy forms [Bardhan, (1977)]; and analysis of
imperfect, interlocking factor markets (particularly credit and land) in the rural sectors of
developing economies [Bardhan, (1980)]. The institutional arrangements for access to
factors of production are viewed as evolving to overcome two types of transactions costs:
imperfect information (e.g., concerning the quality of the tenants' input decisions) and/or
incomplete markets (e.g., for credit to the tenant and for insurance against risk).
Written more broadly, the dynamies of institutional change in the development process
have been emphasized by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) [see also Binswanger and Ruttan
(1978)]. This line of inquiry examines the economic inducements to technical and
institutional change. Particular emphasis has been given to the process of public sector
research and to the institutional structure through which change is facilitated. By contrast
to the view that sees institutions as constraints to technical change and development, Hayami
and Ruttan argue that ''institutional reform is appropriately viewed more as a response to
the new opportunities for the productive use of human and material resources opened up by
advances in technology than as a precondition for agricultural development" (p. 258). In
a more general sence, institutional change is portrayed as a significant element in the process
of adaptation to changing economic circumstances. As costs and opportunities change,
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a society is faced with the challenge of altering its behavioral rules and patterns to fit new
circumstances. Hayami (1980) has developed an economic approach to village community
and institutions; he hypothesizes that the relative resource scarcity in a community determines
the degree of tightness of its community structure. Resource scarcity requires efficient
coordination and, therefore, engenders the need for greater control and enforcement.
CONFLICT CRISIS
The other major approach on which economists have relied for an understanding of institutional dynamics is that which focuses on conflict and the economic crises generated by
these conflicts. The classical Marxist statement is that institutional change originates in class
struggle. The motivation for institutional change is the tension between what we would call
the optimally achievable output at a given technology frontier (i.e., the forces of production)
and the achievable output with given institutional class relations in the production process
(i.e., the relations of production). The gap between the two may be viewed as an indicator
of the potential benefits of change.
When this gap is large, which is our way of saying that the relations of production are
fetters upon the forces of production, class struggle emerges and change is set in motion.
The growth orientation of capitalists is seen as a prime mover in this process. To quote
Marx (1925): "Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and the Prophets." In more modern
language, we have Joan Robinson's (1956) reference to "animal spirits." By contrast to the
neoclassical cost-benefit principle, the cause of change here is a growth orientation in which
there is little or no explicit cost consideration. Change is dialectic-the result of internal
contradictions-which means that the process is non smooth and occurs in jumps. As is discussed below, these features have important implications for the selection of modeling
techniques.
Working within this general framework, Alain de Janvry's (1981) model of institutional
change in nonsocialist societies states that the dialectic generated by the dynamics of the
economic system creates a legitimacy crisis at the political level. Governments can respond
in three possible ways: with cosmetic changes, with institutional reforms, or with repression
designed to avert institutional reforms. Modeling these events depends not only on the selection of a dynamic model of the economy but, also, on the specification of those components
which define a legitimacy gap and the political response to the gap. Thus, one needs an
expectation-generating mechanism to forecast a future path; an evaluation or norm-generating
mechanism to evaluate whether the expected future path is good, bad, or indifferent; and a
government response function representing the political decision process in the context of the
legitimacy crises generated by the gap between the expected future path and the morally and
ideologically acceptable path. Our view is that the implementation of such a model would
be both feasible and interesting. A reinterpretation of a Marxian model of socialist dynamic
is presented in the very interesting book by Roemer (1983).
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SOCIOBIOLOGY
A third conceptual approach comes from outside the conventional boundaries of economic inquiry and is distinguished from other models by its assumption that there is a system
and that this system has a mind of its own. In other words, there is such a thing as an
ethos for a given institution; and this ethos is over and above the motivations of constituent
members. Therefore, we take the sociobiology approach to mean that the system, as a
whole, has an objective function which is being optimized; and the objective function that
is generally chosen maximizes survival probability. In our context, then, the objective function that is being optimized is that which maximizes the survival probability of the institution itself.
Operationalizing the sociobiology view with respect to institutions requires solving some
thorny problems. In particular, whose survival probability is being maximized ? The difficulty is illustrated by looking at an example such as termites-a very fascinating natural system.
Here the system of division of labor has been engrained genetically. Some members can only
reproduce but cannot feed themselves and cannot defend themselves; those in another
group can feed themselves and others, but cannot defend themselves; and another
group (the warriors) can defend the system but cannot feed themselves or reproduce. Signals
of the needs for each type of member are transmitted through the mix of nutrients which the
reproducing termites receive in their food. In such a system, defining whose survival is
being maximized is, indeed, a challenge; clearly, the system minimizes the probability of survival of any single class of members and thereby maximizes the probability of survival of the
interactive system. It is not unusual to find similar complexities when studying highly
developed social institutions.
Other issues which need to be addressed are the time horizon over which survival probability is maximized and the difference between short-run and long-run maximization. Some
systems with very long survival horizons and survival capacity, such as the predator-prey
systems, have a cycle of survival built into them. On the human level, we need to ask what
purposes are served by wanings and risings and how long-run survival capacity may be dis·
turbed by attempts to eliminate cycles.
Elements of this sociobiological approach can be seen in Eric Jones' (1981) interpretation
of economic history in which he links the character and frequency of disasters in Asia and in
Europe to the differences in cultural and social patterns found in these two regions of the
world. His theory posits that the incidence of natural disasters, such as large- scale floods and
earthquakes, has been much larger in Asia than in Europe and that this has had a significant
impact on the evolving social structure and on the demographic pattern. For example,
floods have required the mobilization of large masses of individuals in order to cope with
prevention and containment; this had led to breeding to the maximum capacity and to autocratic, hierarchic systems of organization. By contrast, the much lower incidence of such
catastrophes in Europe is seen to have resulted in smaller families, greater investment in the
education of children, and decentralization. His thesis is, of course, needs to validate it
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more carefully than he has done. (One glaring problem is that his incidence of disaster is
not normalized with respect to area.) However, it is a promising line of research and
interesting because of its very sweep.
Nelson and Winter"s (1982) evolutionary theory of economic organizations offers another
example of a biological approach to economic institutions. Organizations evolve routines
for carrying out all of their activities (production, innovation, sales, decision making).
Natural selection guides the evolution of these routines and yields a process of long-term
change. In development literature bJsed on research in the Amazon, Norgaard (1981),
emphasizes the linkages between agricultural activity, the ecosystem, and social organization.
John P. Powelson (1972) undertakes the Herculean task of explaining the process of growth
through a study of institutional selection and institutional effectiveness that draws not only
on economic theory but also the work of sociologists and political scientists. Powelson, like
North, covers a wide canvas; however, the theoreticJI underpinnings of Powelson's work
are less focused and more tentative than North's and thus have not offered a clear target for
criticism or a concrete paradigm stimulating a new body of research.
III TECHNIQUES FOR MODELING INSTITUTIONS
After having described the essential elements of institutions and having discussed three
important conceptual approaches to institutional research, we wish to conclude by briefly
surveying potentially interesting, underutilized techniques for modeling specific aspects of
institutional change. We shall not discuss the neoclassical approach based on marginal
economics because it is too familiar.
GAME THEORY
The evolution of institutions can be characterized by means of game theory as resulting
from a process of multilateral decision making. Indeed, Shubik (1982) states that "a theory
of games is, among other things, a theory of organization" (p.7). Its application to economics
dates to Cournot (1897) and Edgeworth (1881), but it is only recently that solution possibi·
lities for interestingly formulated games involving more than two players and uncertainty
have become possible. The Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and forthcoming approach to n·
person noncooperative games with incomplete information offers a most promising vehicle
for the study of institutional change.
An interesting application of game theory to the modeling of the U.S. economy, as
described by the interaction between regulated economic entities and the regulatory mechanisms, is given in Reiter and Hughes (1981).
In economic development, game theoretic approaches have been used in analyzing
contractural arrangements in agriculture. A representative sampling of this very active
literature includes the work of Newbery and Stiglitz who have provided theoretical treatments of sharecropping with emphasis on imperfect information and risk sharing [Newbery
(1975, 1977), Stiglitz (1974), and Newbery and Stiglitz (1979)]. Bell and Zusman (1976, 1980)
have considered these issues in the context of a model in which the contract between landlord
and tenant is the outcome of a simultaneous dyadic bargaining process. The interlinked
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nature of transactions in land, labor, and credit in rural factor markets has been given
particular attention in the modeling efforts of Braverman and Srinivasan (1979) and
Braverman and Stiglitz (1981, 1982). An excellent critical survey of the literature on contrac·
tual arrangements and rural labor markets in developing countries has recently been written
by Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1981).
Moving away from the development literature, two recent contributions to the general
economic literature on institutions should be noted. Both works employ game theory believ·
ing that it offers the most fruitful framework for studying the institutional changes that
merge from the interaction of maximizing individuals. Thompson and Faith (1981) build
a hierarchical model of strategic behavior which they argue has particular applicability to
the choice of political-economic systems. With an eye toward developing a general model
suitable for examining the evolution of property rights, systems of coordination, political
organizations, and other institutions which solve recurring social and economic problems,
Andrew Schotter (1981) makes a major contribution to the institutional literature. In parti·
cu1ar, Chapter 3, "A Mathematical Theory of Institution Creation," coauthored with S.
Berman, presents an n-person, noncooperative supergame in which agents make repeated
choices over an infinite time horizon. Schotter wants to build a model in which the history
of the play of the game impacts the choices made; this leads him to a mathematical formula·
tion in which selected and surviving social institutions are the absorbing: state of a stochastic
process. Although Schetter's theory is presented in a provisional manner and "in no way
purports to be fully mature," it does make a substantial contribution to its stated intent of
being a "first step in an attempt to liberate economics from its fixation on competitive
markets as an ax-all-encompassing institutional framework" (pages xi and 1). Schotter has
developed one of the more significant formal models of institutional change to date.
STOCHASTIC LEARNING THEORY
Another modeling technique which has some potential is that of stochastic learning
theory developed and utilized, largely independently, by engineers studying the design of
learning robots and by psychologists studying human learning. In both cases learning is
not so much a matter of collecting and using information as it is the changing of behavior
in response to a stochastic system of reinforcements. In very simple terms stochastic
learning theory offers a mathematical framework for modeling how experience gets translated
into behavior: the behavior of humans; the behavior of robots; and, it is suggested here, the
behavior of institutions such as universities, governments, bureaucracies, or foreign policy
establishments. This approach seems particulary consonant with the sociobiology, evolutionary view of institutional growth.
The essence of stochastic learning models is represented in the reinforcement or adjustment schemes used. An action is taken by a given actor in ignorance of the state of the
environment as described by a probability distribution on outcomes. In general, when an
action is successful in a given period the probability of selecting that action in the next period
is increased; and the probabilities of all other actions are decreased. The choice of how to
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adjust the probabilities of successive successful choices is called the reinforcement scheme.
Under some linear reinforcement schemes, the "learner" converges upon a constant probability. Thus, the agent "learns" about the probability set facing him that describes the nature
of the payoff to choices in a random environment.
The pioneering work on learning models in mathematical psychology was done by Bush
and Mosteller (1955). Subsequent studies included treatments by Atkinson, Bower, and
Crothers (1965) who extended the analysis to group interaction and oligopoly. Much of the
work by engineers has been done in the Soviet Union [e.g., Tsetlin (1961), Tsypkin (1971,
1973), and Tsypkin and Poznyak (1977)]. Tsetlin's work (1973) has included applications
to biological systems. In this country, Narendra and associates have made many contributions to the literature including a major survey [Narendra and Thathachar (1974)]. Also
noteworthy is the volume of articles edited by Narendra which contains an extensive
"Bibliography on Learning Automata" compiled by Lakshmivarahan (1977). K. Fu and
associates (1970), 197la, 197lb) have treated learning automata extensively within the context
of adaptive control theory and pattern recognition.
The general subject of stochastic learning systems ha' received rigorous mathematical
treatment by Losifescu and Theodorescu (1969) and by Norman (1972). A principal investigator among economists using learning models has been Cross (1973) who presents a general
theory of stochastic learning in economic behavior; his later works apply that theory to
migration and to consumer behavior (Cross, 1979). Schmalensee (1972) evaluates the applicability of stochastic learning models to both firm and household choices under uncertainty,
and Himmelweit (1976) formulates a production model based on stochastic learning. Bray
and Kreps (1981) use stochastic learning theory to demonstrate that any rational learning
model leads to convergence to a set of rational expectations. Stochastic learning models
have not been applied to economic development or to institutional modeling. However, we
believe that the incorporation of stochastic learning behavior into a game theoretic framework offers a particularly rich and versatile modeling tool for the study of the dynamic
interaction between institutions and their environments. A study of implicit labor contracts
in a kibbutz is currently underway using this approach (Dodge, forthcoming).
The theory of self-organizing systems - an extension of stochastic learning models to
assemblies of stochastic automata comes from mathematical statistics and provides another
interesting and underexploited class of techniques [Borovikov and Bryzgalov (1965), Tsetlin
and Krylov (1963), and Whittle (1965a, 1965b, and 1972)]. The theory posits an ensemble
of objects that are not differentiated but eventually evolve into patterns of specialization due
to the impact of exogenous stimuli and/or endogenous reinforcement. This approach has
been applied to exploring the impact of system size on the complexity of the system of
division of labor [Whittle (1977)]. It would appear to offer an interesting approach to the
modeling of village community behavior.
FUZZY SETS
Another class of interesting techniques for modeling institutions is offered by the theory
of fuzzy sets [Zadeh (1973) and Bellman and Zadeh (1970)). A good summary technical
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exposition is available in Kaufmann (1975). We find in fuzzy-set theory the capacity to
model something we stressed in tl1e description of institutions, namely, that things are seldom
purely A or purely B but usually are some of A and some of B. By contrast to ordinary
set theory in which an object can be a member of a single set only, fuzzy sets allow us
to speak in terms of the degree of membership of an object in a set. For example, we can
speak of a labor constraint having a degree of membership of '8 in a set of binding constraints and a '2 or '3 degree of membership in the set of nonbinding constraints. This
approach has an added advantage in th1t the calculus of optimizing fuzzy sets is actually
simpler than that of usual optimization problems [see, for example, Yager (1975, 1977)].
Conceptually, one would specify a set of alternative structures, Xt, and objectives, AJ,
and associate with each structure a number between 0 and 1 which is indicative of how well
structure Xt satisfies objective AJ. (This then specifies the objectives as fuzzy sets of the structures, Xt.) Then, using rules developed by Bellman and Zadeh ( 1970) and Zadeh (1973), one
can associate with each structure a number, D(Xt), which is indic.Ltive of how well the structure satisfies the totality of all the multiple objectives, AJ. lt then becomes a simple matter to
optimize Xt by choosing that structure which maximizes the multiple objectives [i.e., has the
largest or smallest value D(Xt)].
As a method of treating institutional change, this technique has the major advantages of
being able to represent both vague (or fuzzy) objectives and precisely defined objectives and
of being able to handle both subjective and objective evaluation procedures.
This approach has not as yet been applied in economics. There is a burgeoning literature
in operations research; and a journal, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, is devoted to theoretical and
applied issues related to fuzzy sets. The approach would seem particulary applicable to issues
relating to institutional design for the delivery of specific services (e.g., credit, research and
development, or water).
CATASTROPHY THEORY
Catastrophy theory is an interesting approach because it is capable of modeling discrete
choices and the dynamics of discrete choice. It is particulary well suited to the modeling of
dialectically generated change and, hence, applicable to Marxian models of institutional
evolution. Furthermore, it is now possible to do some econometrics with catastrophe manifolds, which. means that there now exists the possibility of validating these models [Cobb
(1978 ,1981), Adelman and Hihn (1982, 1983)].
The theory was originated by Thorn (1975) and has subsequently been applied to a
variety of biological and social phenomena by Zeeman ( 1977), Stewart and Woodcock ( 1981),
and others too numerous to list. Good mathematical expositions are given in Poston and
Stewart (1978) and Woodcock and Davis (1978).
Catastrophe theory is a very recent and controversial extension of differential calculus.
Catastrophe theoretic models posit the existence of a system of differential equations in which
the motion of the system is a general function of both the state variables (X) and their parameters (a), dX/dt=f(X, a). Both the state variables and the parameters change systematically
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ver time, but the parameters change much more slowly. For some combinations of value
fthe parameters, a, the system h1s a single solution; for others, it has multiple solutions.
{here multiple solutions exist, a short-run equilibrium can jump from one region in the state
>ace to another and, therefore, can exhibit large discontinuities for small changes in paraleter values. Thorn's basic insight was that the behavior of discontinuous relationships and
llStable equilibria can be described in canonical form by an f (X, a) which is one of a small
~mber of polynomial forms that are themselves continuous.
Economic applications of catastrophe theory h1ve been few. Varian (1979) has employed
to construct a generalization of Kaldor's (1940) model of the trade cycle. Wiseman and
arayia (1981) have reviewed its applications to urban system. Mees (1975) has used it to
odel the revival of medieval cities after the black death. More generally, Renfrew and Poston
979) hwe used catastrophe theory to explain discontinuities in settlement patterns of tradilnal farming communities. Adelman and Hihn (1982) have applied it to the analysis of
:onomic forces behind discontinuous changes in economic ideology of political regimes in
:veloping countries, especially Latin America.
ONCLUSION
In an address to an annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association,
obel laureate T. W. Schultz (1968) S.'tid :
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"It is currently a mark of sophistication in presenting economic models not to mention institutions. But for all that, it is a significant trait of contemporary economics that,
despite this omission, it manages somehow to find support for institutional change. It is
a neat trick, but it cannot hide the fact that, in thinking about institutions, the analytical cupboard is bare" (p. 1113).

Belli

In the years since Schultz made these remarks, attitudes, as well as techniques, have
1dergone change. Yet despite these shifts, the economics profession is still far from having
·rived at an accepted and well-tested theoretical framework for the analysis of institutional
1ange. We have considered here the current state of knowledge and the potential future
rections in modeling institutional change with particular reference to the study of develong countries.
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